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The renowned Kenyan philosopher, Prof. D.A. Masolo, currently teaching at the 
University of Louisville, Kentucky, U.S.A., is much more than a historian of African 
philosophy: he is also a rigorous critic of current trends in the field. His latest book, 
Self and Community in a Changing World, explores the relationship between two 
concepts that have been the subject of socio-political philosophy for more than two 
millennia. The American Heritage dictionary tells us that “self” designates “The total, 
essential, or particular being of a person; the indiv dual”. The same dictionary states 
that one of the meanings of the term “community” is “A group of people having 
common interests.” However, this latter definition is rather vague, and can be 
significantly aided by Heywood (2004), who notes that the term “community” usually 
suggests a group within which there are strong ties and a collective identity. A 
genuine community is therefore distinguished by the bonds of comradeship, loyalty 
and duty. In that sense, community refers to the social roots of individual identity 
(Heywood 2004, 33). 
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In his introduction (pp.1-15), Masolo states that one of the main goals of his book is 
to identify what he considers to be the key theory-oriented ideas and issues that have 
guided the recent history of African philosophy. He is quick to concede that 
consensus on common themes and on their articulation in African philosophy is 
difficult to arrive at, and is not even necessary. For him, what is important is the 
exchange of ideas among various historians of African philosophy, as such exchange 
is what keeps the discipline alive by encouraging debate.  For him, the question of re-
working and integrating indigenous knowledge into the new philosophical order runs 
through all the matters discussed in the book for the important reason that philosophy 
is always a specialized type of reflection on different aspects of everyday lives and 
experiences as well as on the presuppositions that drive them or on which they are 
built. 
 
Philosophy and Indigenous Knowledge 
In his first chapter, the author focuses on the question of the relationship between 
philosophy and indigenous knowledge. He points out tha in a broad sense, the position a 
culture chooses on the relation between theory and reality, that is, between general explanations and 
observational data, is its center (p.17). He goes on to outline the changing usages of the term 
“indigenous”, from the meaning arrogated to it at the dawn of colonialism when it signified an 
otherness, to its current usage, where it expresses the hift towards pluralism. Masolo asserts that since 
Kuhn, the study of the nature of scientific theory has progressively blurred the lines among the 
sciences, humanities and social sciences, resulting in an enhanced understanding on all sides, and 
placing realism at the centre of the debate (p.23). For him, several factors account for the re-emergence 
of indigenous knowledge, among which are the evident grading effects of Western industrialization 
on the environment, the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent motivation of Western governmental 
and non-governmental agencies to help poor countries to identify local solutions to their problems. 
 
A discussion of indigenous knowledge in the African context would be incomplete if 
it did not address the question of ethnophilosophy, t at is, the study of the thought of 
whole African communities as championed by Placide Tempels towards the middle of 
the last century (see Tempels 1959). Masolo claims that the debate about the place of 
ethnophilosophy initially seemed to pit African knowledge systems against 
philosophy as a specialist field of knowledge. According to him, what is important is 
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for intellectuals to reflect on how to create a present different from the past. This 
being so, the old distinctions between traditional and modern, indigenous and colonial 
disappear. Recognising the dictates of the present does not necessarily render the 
modes of expression of the indigenous system (such as the values of collective 
identity) obsolete, if these are properly defined and appropriately applied to the 
domains where they remain relevant and potent (pp.27-28). Masolo seeks to 
demonstrate that philosophical endeavours begin with the everyday, the familiar, 
which is part of the indigenous, as embedded in the locutions that bridge our relations 
with the external world around us, a claim long established in the ordinary language 
philosophy movement (p.31). 
 
Masolo is passionate about the emancipation of African scholarship from Western 
dominance. He urges African scholars to find ways of financing their own academic 
endeavours, so that they can be free to discuss what is truly of concern to them and 
their people: 
Africans will not change Africa if they depend on Western 
organizations to give them funds even to define what indigenous 
knowledge and indigenous development are or when thy wait for 
Western organizations to pay them to meet with and tell each other 
(but also be told by the West) what they should be thinking about. 
Until Africans discard the attitude of dependency and until they 
transition to the point of defining their needs and funding their own 
initiatives, the definitions will remain primarily oriented toward donor 
boardrooms for the purpose of extracting per diem allow nces and the 
elegant essays will remain little more than tools of personal 
convenience (p.34). 
 
The author’s challenge to African scholars to find ways of convening and sustaining 
their own debates is timely. Why is it that we must wait for some European 
foundation or government to convene a conference on African philosophy? It seems 
to me that this dependency is spawned by our failure to be creative. Why must a 
conference be held in a five-star hotel with conference bags and T-shirts to boot if we 
cannot afford it? Why not simply reserve a conference room in one of our universities, 
present our papers, deliberate on them, and then retreat to our simple private 
accommodations? Why not use the Internet to convene international conferences, 
thereby circumventing the need for costly air tickets? Why not use the Internet to 
publish more high quality journals under the Open Access model - a model which is 
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much more affordable for both the publisher and reader, and whose reach is much 
more expansive than the traditional journal in print? 
 
In the endeavour to achieve intellectual decolonization, some African thinkers have 
advocated for the use of African languages in scholarly endeavours. In the mid 1970s, 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, the celebrated Kenyan novelist and playwright, ventured into 
writing his works in Gikuyu, so that the English rend rings of them would be 
translations. Is this a worthwhile venture in philosophy? While conceding the obvious 
difficulties of communication across the approximately 1700 African linguistic 
communities, Masolo is of the view that writing philosophy in African languages 
should still be done for two reasons: to encourage local debate about the 
understanding and interpretation of indigenous concepts and theories, and to preserve 
these thought expressions in their original renditions (p.44). 
 
Another important question in the debate on the nature of African philosophy has 
been that of the place of written philosophical texts. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
prolific Beninese philosopher, Paulin J. Hountondji, had asserted that African 
philosophy is constituted by "a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans 
and described as philosophical by their authors themselves” (Hountondji 1983, 33), and “a 
literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical problems" (Hountondji 1983, 
63). Hountondji’s idea seemed to be that philosophy grows through written works, and 
that no work of philosophy can begin from the orally transmitted wisdom of a people.  
In contrast to this position, Masolo subscribes to the view that works of African 
philosophers who base the gist of their reflections  their cultures teaches us that “all 
philosophy, not just African philosophy, is embedde in culture by virtue of the 
observation that philosophical problems stem from and re part of how philosophers 
consciously and critically live the cultures of their times. Similarly, in contemporary 
Africa, just like everywhere else, everyday beliefs and practices of ordinary people 
continue to mingle with the specialized (carefully considered and sifted) beliefs and 
knowledge of the professionals” (p.50). 
 
Philosophy and the Orders of Consciousness 
In his second chapter, Prof. Masolo examines the relationship between philosophy as 
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an academic discipline and the orders of consciousness. Continuing and extending 
from the previous chapter the discussion on the relvance of indigenous thought 
systems to the philosophical enterprise, he sets out by stating that “The emphasis on 
content and methodology in philosophical traditions can be traced to circumstances 
that identify how different peoples of the world have striven to manage their cultures 
and their histories. In that sense, such emphases bear the marks of indigeneity, 
meaning that they are indicators of the ways that people think differently about the 
world” (p.51). 
 
The author goes on to point out that with the attainment of political independence in 
Asian and African countries, “… the striving is no longer the search for the elusive 
universal but a search for the integration of diversity—including diversity in 
knowledge—into the common forum for learning” (p.51). This is to say that the view 
gaining wide currency is that different cultures have their own unique ways of 
acquiring and using knowledge, so that the globalised human society must 
accommodate the various cultural perspectives in this regard. This development has 
made it possible to ask pertinent questions about the distinct characteristics of African 
modes of knowledge. Masolo identifies the following as some of the most common 
questions in this regard: “How do African people think differently from other people 
and what are those differences? What do they stem fro ? Or do we differ at all?” 
(p.51). For Masolo, the question of the idea and reality of personhood has been central 
to debate among African philosophers: “… is there, and what is, our model of a 
person? And what, in our value systems, do aspects of such a model point to that are 
different from other value systems elsewhere?” (p.52). 
 
Masolo characterizes the core of recent debates in African philosophy as that of 
reconciling the indigenous orders of knowledge with the orders of philosophical 
knowledge, a matter with regard to which Paulin J. Hountondji is one of the most 
insistent and the most recognized of contemporary Af ican philosophers, besides also 
being one of the most controversial (P.52). Masolo l oks at what has happened in the 
scene of African philosophy since Hountondji’s most noted work, African 
Philosophy: Myth and Reality, was first published in English in1983(p.53). The 
publication had made the philosophers in the former English colonies aware of 
Hountondji’s thoroughgoing criticism of the work ofPlacide Tempels and that of 
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African scholars who had subscribed to Tempels’ model of studying and defining 
African philosophy. For me one of the most memorable passages in Hountondji’s 
critique of what he calls ethnophilosophy is the following: 
Ethnophilosophy can now be seen in its true light.  Because it has to 
account for an imaginary unanimity, to interpret a text which nowhere 
exists and has to be constantly reinvented, it is a science without an 
object, a ‘crazed language' accountable to nothing, a discourse that has 
no referent, so that its fallacy can never be demonstrated.  Tempels can 
then maintain that for the Bantu being is power, and Kagame can beg 
to differ:  We have no means of settling the quarrel (Hountondji 1983, 
62). 
 
For Hountondji, both Tempels and Kagame simply make use of African traditions and 
oral literature, and project on to them their own philosophical beliefs, hoping thereby 
to enhance their credibility (Hountondji 1983, 62). 
 
Several African scholars objected to Hountondji’s critique of ethnophilosophy, 
accusing him of scientism, elitism and Occidentalism. As Masolo explains, 
Hountondji’s critique of ethnophilosophy had some excesses that appeared to leave no 
room for a positive engagement with the ordinary or everyday experiences and 
knowledge articulations of local peoples. It gave th impression that philosophy was 
the opposite of the “ordinary” rather than its clarification, be it analytically or 
synthetically (p.61). This prompted Hountondji to write a new preface to the second 
edition of the English translation of African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, published 
in 1996, in response to some of the criticisms. As Ma olo explains, both the preface to 
the second edition and his other recent work help clarify that Hountondji is not - and 
he explains that he never was - an enemy of Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems, 
as was misleadingly assumed by most of those who did not like his critique of 
ethnophilosophy. Indeed, he has lately become one of the strongest and most visible 
and audible defenders of indigenous knowledges. His point is that in most areas 
indigenous knowledges are in dire need of critical jump starts (p.59). Masolo goes on 
to observe that in another of Hountondji’s more recent publications, The Struggle for 
Meaning: Reflections on Philosophy, Culture, and Democracy in Africa (2002), 
Hountondji asserts that humans constitute a plurality of subjects that are not reducible 
to the anonymous chorus of the crowd that both ethnop ilosophy and the totalitarian 
political discourse of post-independence dictators preferred (Masolo, p.83). 
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Masolo also points out that concurrently with the ethnophilosophy debate, another 
controversy, ignited by Thomas Kuhn’s work on the toretical nature and historical 
character of scientific knowledge, most notably in his The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962), was brewing over whether or not knowledge generally, and 
scientific theory in particular, was free of the influence of everyday human 
aspirations, beliefs, endeavors, and compromises (Masolo, pp.59-60). He goes on to 
note that some of Kuhn’s adherents have now popularised the view that scientific 
knowledge is of necessity an aspect of local knowledge, and Hountondji now has 
embraced this view (Masolo, p.60). According to Masolo, what Hountondji had said 
about philosophy as a body of literature must now be re-interpreted to accommodate 
oral literature and oral philosophical expressions (p.60). 
 
In a nutshell, Masolo makes it clear that as a successful response to critics, 
Hountondji’s preface to his second edition of African Philosophy: Myth and Reality 
establishes itself and repositions the entire text as a new terminus in the discursive 
process, thus pointing in the very direction that Hountondji’s original critique of 
ethnophilosophy had suggested as the proper nature of philosophical practice, that is, 
a discursive activity rather than an established body of truths (Masolo, p.59). 
 
Masolo himself manifests a critical approach to African philosophy when he 
compares the works of Hountondji with those of one of the most well known 
champions of the concept of African identity, namely, Léopold Sédar Senghor. Those 
who were opposed to Hountondji’s critique of ethnophilosophy frequently saw the 
thought of Senghor as a more appropriate response t Western domination. However, 
Masolo points out that in Hountondji’s critique of ethnophilosophy, he followed 
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, while Senghor’s Negritude was inspired by an 
anti-Cartesian current in France, headed famously by Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
phenomenology, and also illustrated by the works of Henri Bergson. According to 
Masolo, Senghor’s expressions of the epistemological uniqueness of Negritude 
closely adopt the vocabulary of Bergson.  Consequently, Masolo suggests that 
Hountondji’s critics would need to show that it is more African to subscribe to Sartre 
or Bergson rather than to Husserl, all of whom are European thinkers (p.93). 
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Masolo also manifests a reflective approach to the African worldview in his own 
critique of Senghor. It will be recalled that Senghor asserted, controversially, that 
while Europeans tend to be predominantly analytic in their thinking, Africans are 
distinctively emotional. Masolo offers an interesting response to this position: “In the 
absence of … additional and racially specific biological attributes that would validate 
Senghor’s theory, one would have to infer that Senghor did not consider black 
Africans to be exactly normal human beings, either because they lack something other 
humans have or because they have something additional  everything else that they 
share with other humans. It has never been clear which of these options serves his 
purpose” (p.94). This matter arises again later in chapter four of the book under the 
related discussion of the nature of mind, and of personhood more generally, in the 
works of Kwasi Wiredu. 
 
Revaluation of Values and the Demand for Liberties 
In the third chapter, the author undertakes thoroughgoing reflection on the tension 
between the freedom of the individual and the authority of society. While this 
problematic is not new, Masolo’s reflection on it is undertaken within the 
contemporary African context with its communalistic orientation coupled with the 
spread of liberal views about individual human rights. He asserts that the adage that 
“the unexamined life is not worth living” holds the k y to an exit from traditions and 
customs of unwarranted misery and suffering for many who are trapped in political 
and cultural persecutions (p.103). Among the dehumanising experiences that are of 
greatest concern to the author are pre-arranged chil marriages and painful rites of 
passage (pp.107-109). Masolo is passionate about the need to divest African traditions 
of their unfettered power over individuals: “The assumption that tradition has its own 
criteria for what qualifies as moral right and wrong outside the jurisdiction of basic 
human rights is one that is likely to make it possible for those who are privileged by a 
traditional power system to think of and to treat those who are dispossessed of such 
powers in the same way they treat their cattle and other possessions” (p.117). 
 
The author further notes that despite political independence in African countries, 
former liberators have turned out to be oppressors. Similarly, village elders continue 
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to oppress women and children (pp.104-105). He uses th  Epilogue to Kwame 
Anthony Appiah’s In My Father’s House, which records the way in which Kwame’s 
clan conducted the burial of his father in ways that violated the dead man’s stated 
wishes, to demonstrate his point (p.105 ff.). Nevertheless, he is quick to add that 
communalist and liberal values are not necessarily mutually exclusive (p.107). Yet he 
still concedes that “…, the idea that the metaphysics of individual identity is almost 
unimaginable without a community to make it possible is a crucial and distinguishing 
point of contrast between African and other philosophical traditions, especially the 
Western variety” (p.134). 
 
Masolo is against the version of liberalism led by Martha Nussbaum of the University 
of Chicago, which views identity claims based on factors such as ethnicity and 
nationality as a hindrance to the full enjoyment of individual liberties. Masolo agrees 
with Nussbaum that human rights are of necessity universal. Indeed, the anti-colonial 
struggle was premised on the universality of human rights (Masolo, p.124). 
Nevertheless, he points out that the effort to dispen e with people’s cultural identity is 
likely to be offensive especially to people who have had to wage wars to reclaim their 
cultural freedom interwoven with their political independence (p.121). This is 
reminiscent of the position of the Canadian political philosopher, Charles Taylor 
(1994), that the so-called difference-blind approach to politics tends to negate the 
identity of groups by forcing people into a homogeneous mold that is untrue to them. 
Minority cultures are then ‘forced to take alien form’, that of the dominant culture. 
Thus for Taylor, the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only 
‘inhuman’ (by suppressing identities), but also ‘highly discriminatory’ against 
minority cultures. 
 
Nevertheless, Masolo is deeply concerned about the repressive character of culture. 
He makes the important observation that “No aspect of ulture, however noble, is an 
end unto itself” (p.122). Furthermore, he observes that at the political level, 
oppression is not always perpetrated by foreigners. The slowness of African 
governments to repeal laws that are oppressive to women and to work towards the 
abolition of repugnant cultural practices is of great concern to Masolo (pp.129-130). 
He also outlines ways in which Islam and Christianiy are slowing down the 
actualization of liberal ideals in African society: Christian missionaries supported 
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colonialism; churchmen have supported African dictators, and aligned their 
requirements to oppressive indigenous cultural elemnts (pp.124-125). 
 
Understanding Personhood: An African Philosophical Anthropology 
In Chapter Four, Masolo examines Kwasi Wiredu’s treatment of the notion of “the 
person”. He points out that for Wiredu, the idea of the person is the pinnacle of an 
African difference in philosophical theory (p.135-137). According to Masolo, “By 
articulating the premetaphysical social genesis of the individual and his or her 
dependence on others for self-actualization, African philosophers have contributed 
significantly to the establishment of an alternative normative standpoint for viewing 
the world from a communalist rather than the indiviualist perspective, and no one 
accomplishes this task nearly as well as Kwasi Wiredu does” (pp.139-140). According 
to Masolo, not only is Wiredu’s African idea of self or the person different and 
interesting, it also subverts familiar notions in epistemology and metaphysics such as 
the nature of truth, mind, abstract ideas, God, spirit and life after death. Furthermore, 
it leads us to a different understanding of the basis of moral universals (p.141 ff.). 
 
Masolo guides his readers through the main elements of Wiredu’s view of 
personhood. He explains that in a view that sharply subverts the popularly believed 
African dualism, Wiredu contends that the physical world with its capacities is all 
there is as the primary basis of all nature; everything else either springs from physical 
reality as its mode of behavior or is metaphorically imagined on the basis of 
similarities with or differences from the physical world (Masolo, p.141). Masolo is 
detailed in his explication, demonstrating the similarit es and differences between 
Wiredu and some prominent Western philosophers suchas John Locke, Gilbert Ryle 
and John Dewey. 
 
The author explains that whether it is cast in the idealistic mode of Plato or in the 
Aristotelian idioms of the collaboration of the different substances of being, dualism 
has, until recently, represented the pinnacle of Western metaphysics, epistemology, 
ethics, and psychology, frequently only modifying the nature of the collaboration 
between matter and nonmaterial substances, or force. African thought, on the other 
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hand, especially in Wiredu’s interpretation, sees nature primarily in its physical sense 
and fundamentally recognizes the various capacities or dispositions of the body 
according to its various specifications. Human nature in particular is accorded great 
attention in African thought (Masolo, pp.151-152). 
 
Some Western thinkers have advocated materialism, insisting that all human 
experiences can be accounted for solely in terms of the human being as a physical 
entity (see for example Hobbes 1904). Indeed, despite its  initial association in the 
1930s with logical positivism’s emphasis on language in the work of Otto Neurath 
and Rudolf Carnap (See Carnap 1959 and Neurath 1983), the term “physicalism” is 
now increasingly used interchangeably with “materialism”. As Daniel Stoljar (2009) 
explains in a somewhat circular but still useful way, “Physicalism is the thesis that 
everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that 
everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical.” Several Western 
philosophers of mind are of the view that physicalism implies the mind/brain identity 
theory, which holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and 
processes of the brain (Smart 2007). 
 
Wiredu is uncomfortable with thoroughgoing physicalism and the associated 
mind/brain identity theory. As Masolo explains, Wiredu adopts a quasi-physicalist 
brand of monism according to which the existence of mind is not denied but is defined 
as an integral and essential or inalienable aspect of the ways that the normal (fully 
developed and healthy) human organism functions. Just as the bright light emitted by 
a light bulb is neither identical to nor exists independently of the wires on which it 
depends for its “existence”, so the mind is neither identical with nor exists 
independently of the materiality of the brain that makes it possible, and it would be 
unsatisfactory to conclude only that it is physical like those things on which it 
necessarily depends or it must be an entity of a completely different, opposed (i.e., 
nonphysical) nature. Rather, the mind is the natural f nction of the relations between 
the parts of the brain that respond to certain stimuli whenever certain conditions 
obtain (Masolo, pp.165-166). 
 
Masolo explains that for Wiredu, communication is an inevitable circumstance of the 
occurrence of thought and therefore an essential mens by which we become persons, 
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not just human beings (p.153). According to Wiredu, mind would not be possible 
without communication. Communication, he says, “makes the mind” (cited in 
Masolo, p.155). Thus Masolo explains that for Wiredu, by means of communicative 
interaction we become more than just human beings: we become persons (p.142). As 
such, humans who are deprived - by impairment, for example - of the ability to 
communicate are deprived of something fundamental to their nature, namely full 
participation in the world of persons (Masolo, p.165). Further, “Being a person and 
being a human being are not the same thing. We are human beings by virtue of the 
particular biological organism that we are. Our biological type defines us as a species 
among other living things, and it involves, among other things, having the kind of 
brain that we possess and all the activities that tis kind of brain is naturally endowed 
to perform” (Masolo, p.154). On the other hand, “… we become persons through 
acquiring and participating in the socially generatd knowledge of norms and actions 
that we learn to live by in order to impose humaneness upon our humanness” 
(Masolo, p.155). In a nutshell, Masolo explains that for Wiredu, human beings are 
born, but persons are socially cultivated (p.174). 
 
In addition, Masolo asserts that in the light of its nonmonadological view of human 
nature, Wiredu’s Cultural Universals and Particulars provides a defining and 
grounding framework for African modes of thought. I poses the fundamental 
question that could be re-framed as follows: What would the philosophical theories as 
we have been made to know them (through a Western-orie ted training in philosophy) 
look like if one were to change the basic underlying sociological assumption - the 
category of the (individualistic) subject—upon which they are built? The author 
explains that the backdrop of this question is what Wiredu refers to as the “radically 
un-Kantian concept of the person” in African thought (Masolo, p.158). Masolo 
observes that this radically un-Kantian person would ndertake philosophical 
reflection within the context of communal existence along the following lines: 
He or she would reflect on metaphysics in terms of the relationships among living 
things. 
His or her epistemology would account for the acquisition of knowledge in terms of a 
communal venture (p.176, 180). 
He or she would justify moral principles solely in terms of their benefit to persons as 
members of society (p.172). 
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He or she would consider spirits to be “entities” only in a metaphorical sense (p.167), 
so that he would regard immortality as a false consequence of the view that posits 
mind, and whatever else is thought to accompany mind, to be “entities” that heave off 
from the body at death (pp.169-170). 
 
Prof. Masolo goes on to explain that for Wiredu, intrinsic to cognition from the point 
of view of a purely biological endowment specific to humans, are the formal laws by 
which we organize beliefs. According to Wiredu, we ar  organisms that go beyond 
instinct in the drive for equilibrium and self-preservation in specific ways, namely, by 
means of reflective perception, abstraction, deduction, and induction. Wiredu asserts 
that these laws are intrinsic to or are ingrained in the nature of mind and organize the 
structure of thought (Masolo, p.175). However, in view of Wiredu’s theory of truth as 
opinion, a critic could ask him if what he says about the laws of thought is also an 
opinion. 
 
The Luo Concept of Juok as the Moral Foundation of Personhood 
In his fifth chapter, Masolo examines the Luo concept of juok as the moral foundation 
of personhood. He is of the view that indigenous concepts of personhood are often 
unhelpfully shrouded in mythical, allegorical or proverbial terminologies that conceal 
the direct and clear meanings that were intended for them. Nevertheless, many 
anthropologists have simply reported the figures of speech without undertaking 
indepth analyses of their meanings. Similarly, persons from the various African 
communities who are aware of the real signification of the figurative language have 
been unwilling to explicate it in the name of guarding the secrets of their circles of 
experts (p.182). 
 
Masolo is of the view that in defining juok as soul or spirit, B.A. Ogot and Okot 
p’Bitek, two renowned Luo scholars, “were influenced and driven by the then-popular 
missionary search for African cosmological entities to imitate the cosmological order 
of the dominant Christian culture. This domination reordered indigenous patterns of 
thought by denying them the status of independent apprehensions and 
conceptualizations” (p.185). In p’Bitek’s examination of the Luo concept of jok, he 
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“Inadvertently, …, began by unquestioningly accepting the category of religion as a 
helpful tool for analyzing and organizing Acholi thought, even though he disagreed 
with the earlier missionary and anthropological positi ns …“ (p.190). On its part, 
Ogot’s analysis of the concept of juok as the vital force is influenced by Tempels’ 
assertions about the vital force in Bantu thought (p.196). Thus in contrast to Ogot and 
p’Bitek, Masolo argues that linguistic evidence suggests that juok is a moral concept 
that seeks to idealize social virtues rather than a metaphysical one that describes the 
nature of entities (p.185 ff.). 
 
Prof. Masolo rejects the European anthropologists’ as ertion that the Luo believed in a 
dualistic cosmos in terms of heaven and earth (pp.188-189). He proceeds to conduct 
an incisive analysis of the use of the Luo term piny (down or earth) to show that for 
the Luo, the dead do not “go to heaven” as the Christian missionaries taught (p.190 
ff.). He summarises that discussion as follows: 
It is clear from these accounts of the meanings of the concept piny (as 
world, earth, authority, or universe) that it is not always thought of as 
being lower or less than anything else. Rather, in a human-centered 
consideration of the complexity of life and its travails, there might not 
be another place to look for an ideal prototype. Humans can only refer 
to their genealogies to recover lessons that sustain social stability 
(p.195). 
 
Masolo seeks to demonstrate that juok has several shades of interrelated meanings, 
although all of them lie at the center of social and moral thought. Two of these are 
particularly instructive. 
 
First, juok refers to a name given to an individual as his or her “official” or ritual 
family name from the maternal or paternal side of his or her ancestry. This helps to 
prevent marriage among people with common ancestry, and provides individuals with 
the means for articulating their personhood (p.196). Masolo makes the thought-
provoking observation that while the missionaries forbade Africans from taking up 
their ancestors’ names, they encouraged them to take up the names of European and 
Jewish ancestors: “Even today African converts are encouraged, even by their fellow 
African churchmen and churchwomen, to pray to the European and Jewish dead 
whose names they bear to intercede for them when thy want favors from god. But 
praying to one’s own clan ancestors amounted to ancestor worship and was therefore 
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prohibited” (p.197). 
 
Second, in the social and moral senses, juok refers to an anti-social attitude and 
character. A form of behavior is branded as juok if it is intentionally aimed at harming 
others or if it is intentionally weird and out of line with expectations of reasonableness 
toward other people and/or things, or when it is determined to have been well 
calculated to cause some form of harm or unpleasant experience to other persons 
(p.199). Furthermore, “When one is called jajuok, moral blame is implied. It is 
assumed that the person has freely chosen to behave in that manner and that he or she 
continues to freely decide to do so” (p.200). Indeed, sharp distinctions are made 
between Jajuok on the one hand, and people who are mentally sick or possessed by 
spirits on the other: the latter two are exempted from moral culpability (p.200). 
 
Many contemporary Luos, particularly those who live in urban areas and only 
occasionally visit their ancestral rural homes, associate the word jajuok with a person 
who runs around peoples homesteads in the dead of night causing paralysing fear. 
Masolo corrects this misconception by pointing out that the idea and practice of 
calling a night-runner jajuok derives from the more general moral connotation of the 
term (p.201). Another form of behavioral juok is believed to be practiced by 
individuals who use a variety of means, all of which are classifiable under the general 
category of “magic and witchcraft”, to cause real hrm to their victims. The jajuok of 
this category can be a j nawi, a jandagla, a jasihoho, a jabilo, or a jatung’ (pp.201-
202). 
 
Consequently, Masolo asserts that “Contrary to older int rpretations, especially those 
influenced by Tempels, …, there are different senses of the term juok that are not 
reductively reconcilable under one concept. To claim that juok is a kind of ‘force’ in 
Tempels’s sense is tantamount to claiming that all the senses of the term (as ancestral 
names, as the mischievous actions of the night-runner or juog yido, and as the magical 
powers of the janawi, jandagla, jabilo, jasihoho, and jatung’) … share a single basic or 
root meaning. Such a position claims, for example, that juok is a ‘power’ that enables 
people who act in those capacities to do so. Two problems arise from this claim. First 
is the universal extension of the attribute to everything, à la Tempels. Second, if juok 
was a metaphysical attribute, then calling someone a jajuok would not amount to an 
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accusation, and anyone who was called that would not take offense. …. But, 
ordinarily people do take offense when they are described as being jajuok because the 
description is understood to imply culpability for conduct associated with the trait” 
(p.202). 
 
It is my view that on the issue of juok as antisocial behaviour, it would have been 
helpful if Masolo had sought to answer the question of the real motivation of those 
designated as such. For example, what is it that causes a person to want to run around 
another’s compound at night causing fear and despondency? How do we account for 
the powerful urge to leave the comfort of one’s home to go and disturb the peace and 
rest of neighbours who are usually also his or her kinsmen and kinswomen? What 
motivates such a person to tame a wild animal for his or her antisocial nocturnal 
escapades? 
 
The author goes on to examine Juok in relation to the English idea of “soul” (p.210 
ff.). He asserts that “The analysis of juok reveals that the concept includes neither 
nonphysical substances that operate independently of physical reality in the general 
sense, nor a nonphysical constituting substance that complements the physical nature 
of humans” (p.210). He goes on to note that “The term ‘juok’ (or its English version, 
‘evil’) is a nonsubstantive noun and implies only that from a moral perspective, we 
recognize and classify some experiences to be qualitatively bad or unpleasant. But 
they are not objects or any other form of substance” (p.210). 
 
For Masolo, in terms of the ontological constitution f personhood, Dholuo provides 
all the indications of materialism and none of dualism. The Luo attribute the 
sustenance of life to chuny, the kernel of biological life. Every organic thing has 
chuny. It makes plants germinate and grow, and it is respon ible for the organic 
functioning of animals, including humans. Chuny is just as responsible for the pulse as 
it is for the growth and use of limbs and other biological organs. Thus a living 
cockroach has no less chuny than a living dog or living human, and no more than a 
living plant (pp.210-211). Masolo goes on to explicate other contexts in which the 
term chuny is used, chiefly in reference to emotional states nd cognitive capacities, 
and insists that in none of them does chuny refer to a substance or an attribute of all 
things, but is rather a complex term that describes a variety of physical and 
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psychological states in living organisms when their ability to respond to stimuli are 
manifest. Chuny also means “center,” “key,” or some other indicator of the core of 
something such that other aspects of the thing can be identified only as peripheral 
(pp.211-212). 
 
However, says Masolo, the European missionaries gave chuny a new meaning. They 
restricted its meaning to something called “soul,” which had hitherto not been part of 
the metaphysical or psychological vocabulary in Dholuo (p.212). What is more, “In a 
general way, the Luo appear to believe that something in the nature of persons 
survives the death of the body. Whatever it is thatsurvives, the Luo appear not to 
have a term for it that might betray what they think to be its nature” (p.212). 
Consequently, some Luo now talk of the shadow (tipo) of the dead person going to 
heaven (polo), but this again is incompatible with Luo thought, which sees tipo in 
physical terms (pp.213-214). Furthermore, “although it is said at death that someone’s 
chuny is ‘disconnected’ (chunye chot), this does not imply the heaving off of a thing 
or a part thereof from another thing. It simply means that life has stopped, as the flow 
of electric current stops when there is a break or disconnection in the wiring. The 
energy is not ‘separated’ in the sense of being carried away toward an existence that is 
separate from the wires that carried it when it was present. Rather, its flow has been 
interrupted and, electrically speaking, the wires have ‘become dead’, in contrast to 
their ‘live’ status when connection allowed the flow f current” (p.215). 
 
Prof. Masolo goes on to examine the various terms used in Dholuo to refer to the act 
of knowing, with the aim of determining how consciousness and selfhood are related 
and what further light they may shed on the idea of the person (pp.214-215). 
Thinking, or thought, is called paro, which is done in two different ways: paro gi 
chuny (thinking inside or to oneself, that is, introspection) and paro gi wich (thinking 
in the head, that is, considering something external to thought) (p.214). 
 
In contrast to Ogot’s assertion about the centrality of juok in the Luo understanding of 
personhood, Masolo asserts that at no time do the everyday uses of concepts such as 
chuny, tipo and paro evoke or even remotely refer to the notion of juok. If juok was 
indeed the basic metaphysical “stuff” of being human, one would expect some 
mention of it in reference to the inner operations f personhood that these latter terms 
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address (p.215). 
 
What about all those rituals that the Luo engage in to ensure that they are in good 
standing with the dead? Do they not indicate that te Luo believed in life after death? 
Masolo’s answer is committedly naturalistic: such rituals are the means by which 
members of a community deal with their own guilty conscience in the face of 
calamities that result in the death of their kin (p.217). Seen in this light, the messages 
of a medium are simply the actions of a community seeking to assert its place through 
an interpretation of its past (pp.219-220). Earlier on he had asserted that the Luo 
believe that the dead continue to linger “somewhere” after death and continue to 
interact with family. But because this “lingering somewhere” is not meant literally, if 
someone were to claim that they “saw” an ancestor, however well regarded he or she 
might have been in life, the claim would quickly betaken as a sign of a mental 
degradation on the part of the claimant (p.196). 
 
Masolo is emphatic that personhood is not constituted of metaphysical parts that only 
make people human. Rather, in addition to human capacities, personhood is 
constituted by the various roles people play in making community real; individuals 
and communities regulate and depend on each other for who and what they become 
(p.218). 
 
The salient feature of Chapters 4 and 5 is the naturalistic interpretation of Akan 
culture by Wiredu and Luo culture by Masolo respectiv ly. Indeed, more than thirty 
years ago, Wiredu had declared that one of the greatest obstacles to development in 
Africa is supernaturalism (Wiredu 1980, 5-6). However, a number of questions arise 
from Wiredu’s and Masolo’s naturalistic approach. Is their assertion that reality is 
purely physical not unjustifiably absolutist? How would we know if there is reality 
beyond the physical realm? Is it not more philosophically sound to concede that such 
a reality, if it exists, is beyond our perception ad thus to suspend judgment on it? 
What about the failure of the logical positivists’ verifiability principle? It will be 
recalled that logical positivism asserted that the only meaningful statements are those 
which refer directly to aspects of the physical world, and which can therefore be 
verified or falsified by the use of the five senses. The only exception to this rule were 
tautological statements such as “A green house is green.” However, the logical 
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positivists ran into serious trouble when they were asked if their basic tenet was 
empirically verifiable or logically consistent: it was neither, and so it too was 
meaningless. Is Wiredu’s and Masolo’s physicalist position free from the same 
verdict? 
 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that both Wiredu and Masolo are avowed naturalists, 
and they go on to argue that based on careful conceptual examination and analysis of 
relevant elements in the cultural reservoirs of their r spective people, the Akan and 
the Luo, especially as these elements are expressed in the respective languages and 
belief systems, only naturalistic perspectives emerge. These positions are bound to 
trigger further debate on the conceptual understanding or interpretation of the matters 
that they define and explain so differently from the popular or conventional 
assumptions about them. Interestingly already, other scholars - like Kwame Gyekye 
regarding interpretation of Akan thought, or B.A. Ogot and Okot p’Bitek on Luo 
thought - who are dualists have gone on to argue that the same communities have 
dualist orientations. This reminds me of Hountondji’s accusation against Tempels and 
Kagame that they simply make use of African traditions and oral literature, and project 
on to them their own philosophical beliefs (Hountondji 1983, 62). 
 
While Wiredu’s and Masolo’s linguistic analyses of relevant Akan and Luo terms 
respectively make for plausible presentations of their positions, their arguments are 
not watertight. For example, they both admit that teir people believed that the dead 
continue to influence the living, but differ with te dualistic interpretation that takes 
such beliefs at face value. What is more, by insisting, as Masolo does, that African 
conceptions of personhood require interpretation to demystify their allegorical 
presentations, is to risk being in the same boat with Tempels who declared that “It is 
we [the European scholars] who will be able to tell them [Africans], in precise terms 
what their inmost concept of being is. They will recognise themselves in our words” 
(Tempels 1959, 36). While Masolo belongs to the Luocommunity whose beliefs he 
seeks to interpret, could it not be argued that his interpretation of Luo thought is one 
that most Luos would find difficult to identify with? Can an old man who participates 
in offering sacrifices to ancestors agree with Masolo that all that he (the old man) is 
doing is to assuage the pangs of his own conscience - that there really is no ancestor 
receiving the sacrifices? 
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Two Forms of Communitarianism: A Comparison 
Having examined the conceptions of personhood in Akan and Luo thought in 
Chapters Four and Five respectively, In Chapter Six Masolo makes a comparison 
between African and Western communitarianism. This suggests that Chapters Four 
and Five focus on notions of the “self”, while Chapter Six interrogates those of 
“community”. 
 
Masolo defines communitarianism as “the political view or ethic that developmental 
and participatory rather than liberal democracy is the most effective means for 
checking and containing aberrant policy and polity. I  is developmental because its 
major concern is to forge avenues for the recognitio  of new rights, and it is 
participatory because in order to win such recognitio , it depends not only on rational 
argumentation but also on collective political action as an inseparable means of 
pressing for these new rights, which, in turn, are collectively shared with others. 
Communitarianism, then, is the collectivist vision f a polity in its struggle for moral 
and other group goals” (p.245). Further, “In its moral definition, communitarianism 
exemplifies belief in the principle of practical altruism as an important social virtue” 
(p.246). 
 
The author gives brief historical backgrounds of the two forms of communitarianism. 
Western communitarianism, he tells us, goes back to the work of the nineteenth 
century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, who taught tha  the state has supreme 
intrinsic value that transcends the aspirations of the individuals who are part of it. 
According to Hegel, only in the state does the individual achieve freedom and self-
fulfillment through participation in its transcendent life (Masolo, pp.222-224). 
Contemporary Western communitarians, especially the Canadian philosopher Charles 
Taylor, claim to continue this Hegelian sense of the individual as part of a larger 
whole within which he or she attains his or her freedom by means of an incarnation of 
a historically creative mind (Masolo, p.224). 
 
Masolo goes on to explain that in Africa, the theoretical beginnings of 
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communitarianism are linked to the politics of independence from European 
colonialism, with some of the leading communitarian thinkers being Léopold Sédar 
Senghor of Senegal, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. 
However, as an ethic of everyday life and social order it precedes recent African 
political and intellectual movements. Its expression can be found in many local idioms 
in African communities (p.246). 
 
Although he sees some similarity between the critiques of individual autonomy in the 
writings of African and Western communitarians (p.253), Masolo is of the view that 
the two versions of communitarianism are markedly different. On the one hand, 
inspired by the effort to regulate the excesses of individualism, “…, Western 
communitarianism functions more as a watchdog for the common good than as a 
robust communitarian theory” (p.229). On the other and, the African political leaders 
who championed communitarianism could refer to tradi ional social and political 
orders in different specific cultural manifestations to support their claims (pp.229-
230). 
 
The author is aware of both the potential benefits and dangers of communitarianism. 
He notes that the values and expectations of the communitarian ethic can be 
misunderstood or even abused, just as the liberties of the individual under liberalism 
have been (pp.249-250). Nevertheless, “Everyone is called upon and is expected to 
make a difference by contributing to the creation of the humane conditions that, at 
least, enhance the community’s ability to reduce unhappiness and suffering” (p.250). 
 
In most of his discussion, Masolo writes as though communalism and 
communitarianism are one and the same thing. However, at one point, he seems to 
identify African thinkers with communalism, and Western ones with 
communitarianism (p.240). In my view, this distinction in terminology should be 
promoted to distinguish the reaction of Western thinkers to the thoroughgoing 
individualism of their society (communitarianism) from the African thinkers’ 
refinement of a social theory that draws rich insights from their cultural orientation 
(communalism). 
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In Lieu of a Conclusion 
In a manner reminiscent of the Epilogue to Kwame Antony Appiah’s In My Father’s 
House, Masolo concludes his book with the presentation of a discussion held in his 
rural home between the author on the one hand, and his father and his father’s peers 
on the other (p.255 ff.). He tells us that “At the c nter of this event was a dispute 
about whether, on what grounds, and when, a person sh uld be obliged to observe 
kwer rituals (cleansing related to the death of a child)” (p.255). On the one hand, 
Masolo’s father and those with him insist that in every case the individual is 
dutybound to defer to all the requirements of Luo ritual for the good of the home seen 
broadly as constituted of the dead, the living and those yet to be born. On the other 
hand, Masolo seeks to help his father to appreciate the fact that social conditions are 
changing and thereby raising the need for greater respect for the individual’s right to 
make his or her own moral decisions. Masolo ends the book by comparing the two 
positions with those of Immanuel Kant (the individualist) and Kwasi Wiredu (the 
communitarian). His last word is that communitarianism anticipates conflicts among 
members of a social group, and facilitates dialogue to r solve them (p.266). 
 
Overall Assessment 
Masolo writes passionately, yet incisively and exhaustively. One comes away from 
each chapter with a clear understanding of the background information that gave rise 
to it, and of ways in which the author has sought to move the discussion forward. 
Perhaps nowhere else is this more evident than in his discussion of the Luo concept of 
juok, where I felt as if I was sitting at the feet of a Luo elder conversant with the 
conceptual culture of his people and the rationale behind it - the kind of person who 
the late Prof. Odera Oruka would have referred to as a philosophic sage (Oruka 1983, 
386). 
 
Besides, Masolo’s focus on indigenous knowledge is timely due to the fact that while 
this issue is attracting considerable interest, it frequently suffers gross 
misrepresentation. A number of writers still seem to harbour the misconception that 
indigenous African knowledge  stands in contradistinction to “modern” knowledge, so 
that, for instance, they would consider the storing of cold water in an earthen pot to be 
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a manifestation of indigenous African knowledge at work, and the storing of water in 
a refridgerator to be an instance of “modern” technology. A number of articles in the 
World Bank’s collection of essays on indigenous African knowledge begin from this 
highly debatable premise (see World Bank 2004). Masolo’  highly competent 
utilisation of Luo thought along with the tools of philosophical analysis demonstrate 
that various facets of knowledge are interdependent rather than mutually exclusive or 
loosely complementary. 
 
What is more, Masolo’s proficiency in both English and French, and his vast exposure 
to the philosophical traditions associated with both languages in Africa and in the 
West, make him a timely “bridge” between African philosophers in the so-called 
Francophone and Anglophone countries. However, to fulfil this role more effectively, 
he needs to supply ample translations of his references to French titles (see for 
example Note 10 on p.56). 
 
All in all, Masolo’s depth of analysis, his supply of ample references to support his 
discourse, and his elegant but generally easy-to-read language makes this book a 
priceless addition to the bookshelf of anyone who seek  to keep abreast with the 
incisive debate now raging concerning the nature of indigenous African knowledge in 
general, and African philosophy in particular. It is a masterly sequel to his African 
Philosophy in Search of Identity (see Masolo 1994). More than four decades ago, 
Kwasi Wiredu stated that the task of philosophy is to examine the intellectual 
foundations of human life using the best available modes of knowledge and reflection 
for human well being (Wiredu 1980, 62). It is my considered opinion that this is what 
Masolo has done in Self and Community in a Changing World. Frantz Fanon declared 
that “Europe's most horrible crime was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of 
the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity” 
(Fanon 1967, 254). Masolo’s book is a significant contribution to the reconstruction of 
the African psyche devastated by centuries of military, economic and ideological 
domination. 
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